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Reconstructing Human Rights is a remarkable book. It sets out, in a most 
compelling way, grounds to support human rights as an ethos – a way to 
approach politics that has the potential to be genuinely emancipatory. The 
book does so not from the widely (and rightly) disparaged universalist wing of 
political theory, but from a critical perspective. This is where the argument is 
most original and most impressive. There are plenty of us who are critical of 
many human rights practices, but supportive of the use of human rights 
language and law in some instances – or at least despairing of an alternative. 
Hoover provides, in a beautifully staged argument, a reconstruction of rights 
that weaves together strands from the work of theorists such as Dewey, 
Connolly and Honig (as well as drawing on Benhabib, Walzer, Habermas and 
others). Like many theorists, Hoover has a razor-sharp ability to recognise and 
expose flaws in arguments. More unusually, he treats the work he is 
responding to with humility and respect, and is thus able to draw his critiques 
into a constructive treatise. Engaging with the book was as rewarding as it was 
intellectually demanding, and the humanity with which Hoover thinks through 
his subject is testament to the potential of his approach. 
 
So, I agree. He’s right. There is virtually nothing of substance in the book that I 
would take issue with. This realisation left me in something of a bind when it 
came to writing this post. But it also, after some time reflecting on the 
implications of the book, left me with a familiar discomfort about the 
relationship between philosophy and action. Rather than discussing the book’s 
argument, therefore, I want instead to think about the tensions that become 
apparent in campaigning for political change using the tool of human rights, in 
one form or another, if approached from Hoover’s position.  
 
Means and ends  
Hoover sets out a radical vision, calling for an ethics with 'a commitment to 
democratic inclusiveness. This commitment presumes that each person (or 
group) should have, at the very least, the space to articulate his claims upon 
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the social order’ (p163). This is stated as a minimal requirement, consistent 
with the book’s deep pluralism that allows for many ways to be human. 
However, this commitment to democratic inclusiveness would require, if it is 
to be meaningful, radical change. To be able to articulate claims within a 
political order, each person would need to be afforded, at the very least, 
reasonable welfare (including freedom from the politically disabling aspects of 
war), some decent standard of education, guarantees of free speech and 
expression, and the freedom to participate in public political life without fear 
of persecution.  
 
But, as Hoover would have no problem acknowledging, the world is a long way 
from his ideal of democratic inclusiveness. Many millions of people face deep 
poverty, violent conflict, and racism and misogyny from state and non-state 
institutions that make their most basic participation in political processes 
either dangerous or impossible. Even in states insulated from the worst forms 
of threat to human flourishing, democratic deficits have led to alienation, riots 
and the political empowerment of petty demagogues. So, there is much work 
to be done if Hoover’s vision is to be achieved. 
 
I greatly admire the ambition of Reconstructing Human Rights, but am 
troubled by a sense that the premises of Hoover’s argument rule out the 
means necessary to achieve it. Towards the end of the book (pp. 210-11), 
Hoover anticipates – and rejects – such an objection: that his argument 
weakens human rights by pulling the universalist rug out from under them. His 
line of reasoning is that there is a significant difference between undermining 
existing ethical principles and acknowledging the lack of universally binding 
principles. This is an important distinction, and I agree that there are no good 
reasons to think that we can establish ethics on anything other than shifting 
sands. But where we differ, I suspect, is what this acknowledgment leads us to 
conclude in terms of the justification of action to support necessarily 
contingent ethics. My argument is as follows:  
1) radical change requires action beyond words, in particular in the form of 
coercion of one form or another but … 
2) the only acceptable form of practice of a human rights ethos if we follow 
Hoover’s argument is non-coercive unless … 
3) we accept some form of contingent ethical fixity in terms of belief, 
consensus or law.  
 
Fighting for rights 
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The main tenor of Hoover’s argument against a liberal human rights regime is 
that human rights, in liberalism, can be complicit in violence: ‘I want to try to 
reveal rather than obscure the ways that liberal cultures of human rights are 
complicit in violence and oppression, noting that the good will expressed in 
such sentiments is compatible in many instances with hierarchy, exploitation, 
and harm’ (p10). However, coercion in various forms, including violence, has 
played a critical role in the embedding of rights into political systems, including 
the international system. The revolutions that established rights within polities 
in the past were violent – lethally so. As were most processes of 
decolonization, the ongoing civil rights movement in the US and the many 
battles (metaphorical and actual) over gender equality – including the 
supposedly peace-loving suffragettes. I’m not making an argument here about 
the necessity of a Terror, or the cathartic qualities of violence, particularly for 
those who have been colonized or oppressed. Nor do I think Hoover needs to 
have a position on this. But he does need to acknowledge, I think, that the 
position he sets out mitigates against anything more than persuasion in order 
to pursue his vision. Yet the history of rights (along with everything else I 
suspect we would agree to be ‘progressive’) shows that it often takes some 
combination of coercion, threats, intimidation, disruption and violence (to 
property, to institutions, to oneself and to others) to change the status quo. 
Change is almost always resisted, particularly when that change involves the 
restriction of the freedoms of the powerful, and it is not therefore surprising 
that it requires more than rhetorical skill to bring it about. Coercive political 
action, i.e. action such as strikes, boycotts, riots, destruction of property and 
seizure/ occupation of land which disrupts the lives of others or makes them 
feel uncomfortable or threatened in significant ways, is a critical part of the 
human rights armory. But it is ethically far harder to justify than non-coercive 
action, due to its capacity to cause harm.  
 
This is more than just an empirical issue – though the empirics matter, and I’m 
happy to be corrected if the historical record shows non-coercive action in 
support of rights to be effective (not necessarily more effective than coercive 
action, given the drawbacks of coercion). Relevant evidence would need, 
however, to differentiate between coercive and non-coercive action rather 
than violent and non-violent, as Hoover’s position makes any kind of coercion 
impossible to justify.  
Perhaps as important as the empirical question is a conceptual point about 
what is fair to require of citizens within democracies. Juliet Hooker’s recent 
work on the Black Loves Matter movement, and black activism around civil 
rights in the US more broadly, posits an interesting challenge to Hoover’s 
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argument here. She contends that the ways in which black activism is policed 
into forms of legitimate and illegitimate politics (broadly mapping onto non-
coercive and coercive action) open to black activists is in itself a form of 
injustice. In a functioning democracy, all groups must occasionally bear the 
costs of the system – no one will have their interests prioritized all of the time. 
However, Hooker notes that people of colour in the US bear the costs of the 
system almost always. The state does little to protect their interests, and state 
organs are a direct threat to black lives. It is, therefore, unjust to require that 
black activism observes democratic norms of non-coercive action. At the same 
time, Hooker argues that scholars and activists have misread evidence about 
the efficacy of peaceful acquiescence by subordinated groups. She shows that 
non-coercive action has little effect on the ethics of dominant groups. Victories 
that have been won by the civil rights movement, on this account, have only 
been won because they have been fought for through disruption, disorder and 
sometimes force. 
And it isn’t just the establishment of rights that might require coercion. The 
protection of human rights as they are currently conceived also requires more 
than talk. I used ‘war’ in the blog title largely because it rhymes. But, more 
substantively, coercive and even military action on behalf of the state might be 
necessary to protect particular groups and to prosecute those who do not 
uphold human rights. Coercive pressure from non-state actors may be most 
effective in holding entities such as multinationals to account for their ethical 
and political responsibilities towards their stakeholders. And, in extremis, 
military action might be needed if the most basic rights of those caught up 
involuntarily in conflict are to be protected, assuming (and it’s a big 
assumption) that such action does not cause a more egregious breach of 
rights, or more substantial harm, than it prevents. I won’t say more about this 
here, although suspect that something should be said about the agents 
involved and whether coercive action is more justifiable when used either by a 
legitimate democratic state and/ or by the relatively powerless/ rights-less. 
 
The argument above suggests that the bounds of civilized dissent probably 
need to be breached if we are to get from where we are now to a world in 
which the realization of Hoover’s radical vision is underway. If it is the case 
that coercive action is required, then can a justification for its use be found 
that is consistent with Hoover’s philosophy? I suspect not. Attempts to 
persuade others of our views can certainly be justified, as can, I think, 
information campaigns and, probably, peaceful protests and relatively 
innocuous civil disobedience (depending on the extent to which they respect 
alternative ways of being human and are designed to be as unthreatening as 
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possible to those who are affected by them). However, as the ways of fighting 
for rights (or any form of ethical or political goods) become more disruptive to 
the lives of others, they get less and less justifiable from a position that takes 
seriously its own contingency and claims to respect the ways others live and 
the values they express. Hoover seems to recognize this within the text, e.g. 
‘such an ethos respects deep pluralism by seeking modes of contestation that 
enable coexistence and encourage inclusion in setting the terms of social 
order, rather than allowing contestation to degenerate into violence and 
exclusion’ (211). He also commends Connolly’s ‘militant pluralism’ in its 
approach – reaching out to others, engaging them and seeking to understand 
their views and exposing the tactics and assumptions of extremists (161). Yet 
he, like Connolly, has little to say about the ‘more stringent actions’ (Connolly, 
quoted in Hoover at p162 fn75) that might be required when ‘the issue is on 
the line’ (ibid).   
 
This is not to say that Hoover doesn’t support the use of some forms of 
coercion to in pursuit of some specific ethical goals – see, for instance, his 
descriptions of coercive actions, such as occupation, taken by the housing 
movement (202-3). He also commends Connolly and Dewey for recognizing 
‘the necessity of force and coercion in politics’ (162). And I suspect that Hoover 
would support the premises and conclusion of Hooker’s argument discussed 
above, including the importance and justifiability of coercive action in the civil 
rights movement. My reading of his argument, however, suggests that such 
support is problematic and quite possibly unjustifiable within the terms set out 
in the book. 
 
The radical potential of the law 
So how is it possible, philosophically, to respect the ways of being human lived 
by others and to recognize the contingency of your own views, but also to 
engage in coercive action in favour of some particular rights/ values/ principles 
that you happen to, contingently but powerfully, support? By basing action on 
belief, consensus or law – although only the last, I argue below, is able to 
justify the use of coercion as a tool of ethics. 
 
The least justifiable bases for coercive action are appeals to belief and to 
consensus. Many fights for human rights have been founded on deep personal 
beliefs about particular issues: on the dominium that people should enjoy over 
their own bodies, on the fundamental equality of humans irrespective of sex, 
race, religion etc. I feel very comfortable with these fights, and am willing to 
tolerate a great deal of coercive force to be applied to promote or uphold 
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these values. But that’s because I share the personal beliefs in question. If the 
use of coercion can be founded on strength of belief alone, with no reference 
to the source or form of the particular beliefs, then we would need, if we are 
to remain consistent in our human rights politics, to uphold the rights of those 
who hold deep personal beliefs that we find to be abhorrent to undertake the 
same kinds of coercive actions. But few would view coercive acts to extend gun 
control laws in the same way as coercive acts to limit them. Or to challenge 
racist police practices versus to uphold them. And looking for partners in our 
beliefs doesn’t help us much here (at least if the ‘us’ is a group broadly on the 
political left). Simple consensus, however powerful or widespread, cannot 
philosophically justify the use of coercive force. History shows us that a vile 
and ignominious variety of views (in terms of my way of being human) about, 
for instance women, people of colour and immigrants, have enjoyed and still 
enjoy widespread consensus. And indeed Hoover carefully and explicitly rejects 
consensus as grounding ethics within the book (and in the introduction to this 
forum). But Hoover does make a more subtle appeal to consensus, through use 
of a particular vocabulary of ‘progressive’ and ‘regressive’, which gestures at 
positions around which his readers are likely to agree. In various places, 
Hoover refers to ‘progressive’ ends, visions and politics. These contrast, in the 
text, with that which is ‘regressive’, ‘exclusionary’ and ‘violent’. Progressive is 
used here as an acclamation – being progressive is a good thing, and to be 
aimed at. Being regressive, by contrast, is bad, and being violent (as noted 
above) is worse. But the experience of the British public in the political 
campaign around Brexit, where each side tended to campaign passionately 
within its own echo chamber, shows us that the views of what counts as 
progressive or regressive are not widely shared. And even if they were, 
consensus alone cannot act as sufficient grounds for coercive political action – 
it has no ethical value in and of itself.  
 
There is another way of generating a kind of contingent fixity to justify the 
coercive action that has arguably been necessary to win human rights victories 
in the past: converting ethical and political positions into law. Hoover does not 
have much time for human rights law, noting that ‘[t]he centralization of 
human rights as law and rhetoric is inherently problematic as it cedes what 
rhetorical and political power human rights may have to established 
authorities, to heads of state and international institutions (135). But law has 
significant advantages over belief and consensus – at its best it is public, 
specific, authoritative and legitimate. It is also efficient. Political action for a 
thorough-going Hooverite would, frankly, be exhausting. Endless participation 
in temporary assemblages would make only temporary gains, and any gains 
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made would have to be endlessly protected. Law offers a way to 
institutionalize change – to utilize state power for ‘progressive’ ends. It also 
provides a foundation from which to justify coercive (even illegal) action to 
support the application of existing law, or to bring about legal change. Law is 
not, of course, an inherently ‘progressive’ tool and is capable of being used for 
good or ill. But Hoover focuses almost exclusively on the limits of law and the 
paradox of institutionalization (179), even while acknowledging that many of 
the social movements he engages spend significant amounts of their time 
campaigning for changes in law or for existing law to be properly administered 
and upheld (180). Law is Janus-faced in this context – it both regulates the use 
of coercion in societies but also provides the only decent justification for 
coercive (often illegal) action to bring about political change, once the 
contingency of ethics has been acknowledged. 
 
We are left, at the end of Reconstructing Human Rights, with an inspiring 
vision: ‘to fight, free of our national belongings, our partial memberships in 
communities of privilege and exclusion; … to see every human face as the face 
of a compatriot, of a subject of care, of an equal’ (218). But in demonstrating 
and celebrating the variety of ways in which human rights have been 
interpreted in particular political fights, Hoover has left significant questions 
hanging. If persuasion does not work on some particular issue, how can we 
legitimately use a human rights ethos to fight, while also affording equal 
respect to all and taking seriously the contingency of our own views? Isn’t law 
the best, or perhaps the least bad, option here, as, ironically, it provides the 
kind of slipping anchor – a temporary but authoritative universal – that can 
justify the coercive action often necessary to bring about radical change?   
